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        This thesis develops an analytical model that describes defense for the Sea 
Base. Although models have been developed for defense of a carrier battle group 
(CVBG) with one High Value Unit (HVU) against air, surface and subsurface attacks, 
there are unique aspects of the Sea Base that are not specifically addressed in CVBG 
defense models. First, the defense of the sea base is different in that there are multiple 
HVUs (Expeditionary Warships – EXWAR Ships) expected in the Sea Base. In addition, 
there is a credible threat of being overwhelmed by High Density Threats (HDTs). This 
model specifically addresses the issue of defending multiple HVUs against HDTs.  
The model also gives a commander insight into the optimal placement of 
defenders with respect to parameters such as threat sector, minimum detection range, 
attacker and defender velocity, and defender weapon ranges. The model can also be used 
for Operational Requirements (ORs) development by Sea Base system designers. By 
inputting parameters associated with certain scenarios, system developers can see how 
performance of a specific parameter, such as weapons range, probability of kill, and radar 
detection range, can affect the quality of Sea Base defense with respect to the effective 
area of defender coverage and the number of defenders required to achieve a certain level 
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 Recently the Navy has been facing an increasing problem countering High 
Density Threats. Current tactics and weapon systems are focused on relatively small 
raids. In addition, many models are centered around a single High Value Unit (HVU) in a 
Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and may be inadequate when considering the defense of a 
Sea Base with multiple HVUs. Moreover, with the Navy reaching its smallest fleet size 
ever since World War II, efficient use of limited defending assets such as guided missile 
destroyers and cruisers has become critical if the Department of the Navy is to continue 
to shape the political-military environment on a global scale. The goal in this thesis is to 
examine the critical factors that contribute to the defense of the Sea Base with respect to 
multiple HVUs against HDTs. The paper will focus primarily on the following factors:  
(1) defender placement relative to threat and HVU positions,  
(2) defender weapons speed,  
(3) defender weapons inventory,  
(4) defender weapons range,  
(5) defender weapons single shot probability of kill,  
(6) HDT size,  
(7) HDT speed,  
(8) threat sector size,  
(9) number of HVUs, and  
(10) placement of HVUs relative to threat and defenders positions.  
 
The analytical model provides an understanding of the relationships of these 
factors and allows Systems Engineers to perform trade off studies during ship or weapon 
system development. In addition, the model can also be used by an operational 
commander charged with the Sea Base defense to utilize his given assets in the most 
efficient manner.  
 The study is divided into three phases, each building on the previous phase. Phase 
I considers the scenario with a single HVU, a single defender, and a single attacker. This 
phase describes the fundamental relationships that comprise Sea Base defense and 
concludes with the maximum sector a single defender can cover within the constraints of 
 xiv 
 
this scenario. Phase II explores the effect of having multiple HVUs on defense of the Sea 
Base with particular emphasis on threat sector coverage and HVU placement. Finally, 
Phase III looks at the effect of having multiple attackers (HDT). This phase examines 
current capabilities and limitations of weapon systems and tactics against HDTs through 
a comparative analysis with a modified weapons system and tactic. The modified system 
is a Fire Control (FC) radar designed for a wide beam illumination of multiple targets. In 
addition, the modified system envisions increasing current missile salvo sizes beyond 
two, as prescribed by the shoot-shoot-look-shoot policy, to allow greater expected 
number of kills against the HDT.  
 The study concludes with numerical examples that illustrate the ideas developed 
in this paper and suggested areas for further study.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt describe the history of military warfare as a progressive 
development of four basic types of engagement: melee, massing, maneuver, and 
swarming. Battles have advanced from disordered clashes of individuals or small groups, 
to the strategy of massed but highly structured formations, and then to the adoption of 
maneuver. The swarm tactic is argued to become the next major advance in military 
doctrine.1 In addition, swarm tactics may be used unintentionally by an enemy. Iraq’s 
extended-range Scud ballistic missiles were so poorly constructed that they broke up 
under the stress of reentry, effectively creating a swarm of "decoys" around the warhead 
that confused the guidance system of the Patriot antimissile defense system. As a result, 
few if any Patriot interceptions were successful.2 
In response to the potential threat of swarm tactics, the Department of Defense 
has been conducting research to develop systems to counter such High Density Threats 
(HDTs). The Millennium ship self-defense system on Sea SLICE was used in Fleet Battle 
Experiment (FBE) J to prove out some key aspects of future littoral combat ship 
requirements, namely the “…[d]efeat of ‘swarm attacks’ of high speed armed intruder 
craft in both symmetric and asymmetric warfare environments.”3  
The purpose of this analysis is to develop an analytical model that describes 
defense for the Sea Base. Although models have been developed for defense of a carrier 
battle group (CVBG) with one High Value Unit (HVU) against air, surface and 
subsurface attacks, there are unique aspects of the Sea Base that are not specifically 
addressed in CVBG defense models. First, the defense of the sea base is different in that 
there are multiple HVUs (Expeditionary Warships – EXWAR Ships) expected in the Sea 
Base. In addition, there is a credible threat of being overwhelmed by HDTs in close 
proximity to enemy shores where the enemy need not have a large navy or long range air 
force to launch an assault. This model will specifically address the issue of defending 
                                                 
1 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). Ch. 2 
2 Theodore A. Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," International Security 16 (3) 
(Winter 1991/1992), pp. 119-171. 
3 http://www.oerlikoncontraves.com/infoservice/aktuell/aktuell.htm, November 23, 2003. 
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multiple HVUs against HDTs. The model will explore how HVU and defender 
positioning affect the quality of force protection with respect to various attackers, 
weapon, and sensor systems.  
The analytical model is developed in phases, starting with one HVU, one 
defender, and one attacker unit and eventually progressing towards multiple HVUs, 
defenders, and attacker units. The model explores optimal placement of defenders with 
respect to parameters such as threat sector, minimum detection range, attacker and 
defender velocity, and defender weapon ranges.  
The model can also be used for Operational Requirements (ORs) development by 
Sea Base system designers. By inputting parameters associated with certain scenarios, 
system developers can see how performance of a specific parameter, such as weapons 
range, probability of kill, and radar detection range, can affect the quality of Sea Base 
defense with respect to the effective area of defender coverage and the number of 
defenders required to achieve a certain level of protection. Additionally, if given a 
probability of success requirement for a defender against a certain number of attackers, 
the model can determine the number of shots/salvos which yields that level of confidence 
and in turn, give insight into what parameters play critical roles in achieving that level of 
success.  
 3
II. PARAMETERS AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Parameters 
-Attacker velocity (kts) 
-Defender velocity (kts) 
-Defender fire rate (rounds/hrs, λ) 
-Defender weapons range (nm) 
-Detection range (nm) 
-Single-shot probability of kill given an engagement (p) 




-Attacker heads straight for HVU 
-Attacker speed >> Defender speed (i.e., missile/UCAV vs. ship) 
-Changes in velocity are instantaneous 
-Identification of enemy is instantaneous 
-Perfect Battle Damage Assessment 
 
Some of the aforementioned parameters are given values during model 
formulation below. As is shown, many of these parameters are interdependent. Thus, 
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III. MODEL FORMULATION: 1 (HVU) x 1(DEFENDER) x 1(ATTACKER) 
 
A. PROBABILITY OF KILL 
While providing protection for HVUs, a defender may want to stay as close to the 
HVUs as possible to allow flexibility in degree of sector coverage. A defender stationed 













Figure 1 – Engagement Range 
  
The defender then, presumably, has the length of the weapons range (rweap) to 
engage incoming attackers. The amount of time an attacker is within the defender’s 
weapons range is given by Eq [1]. The number of shots the defender can fire will be a 
function of the attacker’s speed, the defender’s weapons range, and the defender’s rate of 
fire and is given by Eq [2]. If p is the single shot probability of a defender’s weapon 
killing an attacker and 1-p is the probability of the attacker surviving, then the probability 
of an attacker surviving multiple independent shots in this scenario is given by Eq [3]. 
 
Variables 
t = time attacker is within defender’s weapons range 







vtar = attacker velocity 
n = number of shots fired by defender 
λ = defender’s firing rate 
p = single shot probability of defender killing an attacker 
    
Equations 
 t = rweap / vtar      Eq [1] 
n = λ x t     Eq [2] 
   Pk = [ 1 – ( 1 – p )n ]    Eq [3] 
 
Probability of kill can also be considered stochastically if the defender’s fire rate 
λ, is modeled as a Poisson process. In such a case, the probability of kill can be expressed 
as:   
 Pk = 1 -  e-λpt     Eq [4] 
 
 For example, let: 
  λ = 1 round per 8 seconds 
  p = 0.7 
  t = 30 seconds 
 
  ( )( )( )307.0811 −−= ePk  
 = 0.9276 
 
B. CRITICAL DISTANCE (cd)  
In scenarios with respect to current US Navy capabilities, attackers are few in 
number (1 or 2 missiles or aircraft), defender’s weapons range is several tens of nautical 
miles, and defender’s single shot probability of kill is relatively high. Still the number of 
possible shots may not suffice to successfully kill all the attackers with a high level of 
probability, especially for supersonic attackers. This problem is exacerbated further by 
HDT attacks.  Thus, the defender may want to somehow increase n, thereby improving its 
probability of successfully engaging the attacker(s). Although  Eq [1] and [2] show that 
 7
increasing the rate of fire or weapons range increases n and could improve our probability 
of kill (Eq [4]), it is possible for a defender to lengthen its engagement range, without 
modification to its weapons systems, by positioning itself closer towards the attacker at 
the start of the engagement. The distance a defender can move towards an incoming 
attacker will be discussed in the section Pre-engagement Maneuvers. In the ideal case, 











Figure 2 - Increased Engagement Range 
 
We can modify Eq [1] to accommodate an increased engagement range as shown 
by     Eq [5]. 
t = 2 x rweap / vtar     Eq [5] 
 
However, the defender need not stay stationary during the engagement. Indeed, 
we assume that the defender attempts to further maximize engagement time by 


















Figure 3 - Engagement Zone 
 
Then the attacker crosses the engagement zone with a relative velocity given by 
Eq [6]. Substituting Eq [6] into Eq [5] yields Eq [7]. 
 
      Variables 
vdef = defender velocity 
vrel = relative velocity 
 
   Equation 
vrel = vtar - vdef     Eq [6] 
tmax = 2 x rweap / vrel    Eq [7]  
 
We will assume that vdef < vtar, so vrel < vtar, since we assume that the defender is 
not stationary.  The time variable in Eq [7] is subscripted with max since it is always 
larger than the time variable in Eq [5].  For ease of reference, we will also rewrite Eq [2] 
with tmax and label it Eq [8].  
 
n = λ x tmax     Eq [8] 
 
Of course, if the attacker velocity is much greater than the defender velocity, this 
movement becomes insignificant. However, if the engagement range is sufficiently large, 
the movement of the defender along the attacker course becomes non-trivial even for 
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scenarios with surface ships as defenders and missiles as attackers. This movement will 
be referred to as adjustment distance (ad). As the following figure shows, the defender 
must then position itself no closer to the HVU than the critical distance (cd), in order to 
maximize its potential engagement range. The positions for the defender and attacker at 














Figure 4 - Critical Distance 
 
This critical distance is the sum of the defender’s weapons range plus the 
defender’s adjustment distance during the engagement. 
 
cd = rweap + ad    Eq [9] 
 
The adjustment distance is a function of the defender’s speed and the amount of time an 
attacker is within the defender’s weapons range. 
 
ad = vdef  x  tmax    Eq [10] 
 






critical distance (cd) 




Thus, substituting Eq [6], [7] and [10] into Eq [9] yields the following equation for 
critical distance: 
   cd = rweap + vdef [2rweap / (vtar – vdef)]   
        = rweap + 2rweap /[(vtar / vdef) - 1]   
             = rweap [ 1 + 2 / (µ –1 ) ]   Eq [11] 
 
Where µ is the velocity ratio vtar / vdef.  
 
C.  PRE-ENGAGEMENT MANEUVERS 
The next step is to consider how radar detection range can allow a defender time 
to maneuver into this critical point of engagement (cpedef) prior to engagement. Consider 
the situation where radar coverage is centered around the HVU. If the attacker is detected 
at a certain detection range (rdet) from the HVU and the defender desires to be at the 
critical point of engagement (cpedef) to maximize the engagement range, then the 
defender has the same amount of time to travel to cpedef as the attacker has to travel to 
cpetar. This time (t0) is a function of the attacker’s relative velocity and the attacker travel 
distance (atd) from initial detection to cpetar and is given by Eq [13]. The atd can be 
determined by subtracting the engagement range (rengage) from the detection range (rdet) as 
given by Eq [12].  
 
   rengage = cd + rweap    
   atd = rdet – rengage       Eq [12] 
























Figure 5 - Defender's Travel Distance 
 
The defender travel distance (dtd) in this situation can be determined by 
multiplying t0 and the defender’s velocity vdef which yields the following equation: 
dtd =  t0  x vdef     Eq [14] 
 
Hence, a commander must place a defender within a circle centered around cpedef 
with radius dtd in order to be able to engage an inbound attacker at cpetar. 
 
D.  THREAT SECTOR 
In the worst case where an attacker can approach the HVU from the outer edges 
of the threat sector, a defender must be in a position to reach the critical engagement 
points (pts 1 and 2) along the attacker’s approach vector as depicted in the following 
figure. Since the defender can only be as far away from the critical engagement points 1 
and 2 as determined by dtd, the defender should be placed in the intersection of the two 
circles with a radius dtd centered around points 1 and 2.  
 
critical distance (cd) 
detection range (rdet) 




engagement range (rengage) 
critical point of 
engagement (cpe def)
critical point of 





















Figure 6 - Defender Placement Zone 
 
In order to give a commander a frame of reference from which to place the 
defender in this overlap zone, we add the variables x, y, z and α to determine points a, b, 
c, and d by using some basic trigonometry. The shaded lens in Figure 7 is the 












critical distance (cd) 
detection range (r det )
dtd






















Figure 7 - Defender Placement Zone Calculations 
 
   y = cd x sin θ     Eq [15] 
   α = cos-1 ( y / dtd )    Eq [16] 
   x = sin α x dtd     Eq [17] 
   z = ( cos θ x cd ) – x    Eq [18] 
 
 
Substituting Eq [16] and [17] into Eq [18] yields: 
















Thus, point a is distance z from the HVU along the center of the threat sector. 
Point b is z + 2x. Points c and d are perpendicular to the line segment formed by the 
points a and b and are both a distance dtd – y away from the midpoint. 
Holding other parameters constant, we can see that widening the threat sector will 
reduce the area of overlap. The maximum threat sector that can be accommodated is 
when the area of overlap converges to a point. This point shall be referred to with the 
Greek letter κ. Continuing to widen the threat sector further prevents the defender from 
being able to reach both cpedef 1 or 2 from any initial placement point. Using the 
following figure for visual reference, we can see that the maximum threat sector is a 
function of the critical distance (cd) and the defender travel distance (dtd) and is given by 
Eq [20]. Point κ also lies on the line that divides the threat sector in half. The distance of 
κ from the HVU is a function of cd and dtd and is given by Eq [21]. 
 
θmax = sin-1 ( dtd / cd )   Eq [20] 

























If dtd equals or exceeds cd, then a single defender stationed alongside the HVU 
would be able to reach not only the critical distances at points 1 and 2, but would be able 
to provide 360° coverage.   
Thus, given a threat sector, this model can generate an area for defender 
placement such that the defender can provide maximum effective coverage over the 
entire threat sector. In addition, given all other parameters except θ, the model can 
generate a maximum effective threat sector coverage for a single defender and the 




Attacker speed 750 kts 
Defender speed 30 kts 
Detection range 150 nm 
Weapons range 25 nm 
 
Using Eq [6]:  vrel  = vtar - vdef 
    = 750kts – 30kts 
    = 720kts 
 
Using Eq [7]:  tmax  = 2 x rweap / vrel 
    = 2 x 25nm / 720kts 
    = 0.0667 hrs 
 
Using Eq [11]: cd  = rweap [ 1 + 2 / (µ –1 ) ]    ( µ = vtar / vdef ) 
    = 25nm[1 + 2 / ( (750kts/30kts) – 1)] 
    = 27.01nm 
 
Using Eq [12]: atd  = rdet – (cd + rweap)    
    = 150nm – (27.01nm + 25nm) 
    = 97.99nm 
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Using Eq [13]: t0   =  atd / vtar  
    = 97.99nm / 750kts 
    = 0.1307  hrs 
 
Using Eq [14]: dtd  =  t0  x vdef  
    = 0.1307 hrs x 30kts 
    = 3.92nm 
 
Using Eq [20]: θmax  = sin-1 ( dtd / cd ) 
    = sin-1 ( 3.92nm /27.01nm ) 
    = 8.344˚ 
 
In this case, solving for θmax yields 8.344° or a threat sector coverage of 
approximately 16.5°.   
 17
IV.  MODEL FORMULATION: m (HVU) x 1(DEFENDER) x 1(ATTACKER) 
 
In this section, we explore the effects of multiple HVUs on a single defender’s 
placement against a single attacker. 
 
A. EFFECT OF MULTIPLE HVUS ON THREAT SECTOR 
If a defender is already defending against its maximum threat sector, multiple 
HVUs must be placed in close proximity to one another for the defender to provide 
maximum protection. However, in the case for the Sea Base, EXWAR ships may be 
restricted in how close they may be stationed from one another because of the large 
airspace requirements inherent in heavy air operations. Thus, from the perspective of the 
approaching attacker, it is more than likely the attacker will find some angular separation 
(Ω) between HVUs. However, any angular offset of secondary HVUs from the primary 

















Figure 9 - Multiple HVUs 
θ 










In the preceding figure, points 1 and 2 are the extreme cpedef  a defender must 
reach in order to engage an attacker with maximum effectiveness within a given threat 
sector as defined by θ. However, the presence of multiple secondary HVUs laterally 
offset from the primary can alter the flight profile of an incoming attacker. If the attacker, 
upon entering the original threat sector, flies a direct path4 towards a laterally offset 
HVU, the attacker will then intersect the defender’s cd circle at points 3 or 4. These two 






















Figure 10 - Effective Threat Sector 
 
                                                 
4 Attackers need not fly direct paths toward HVUs, but due to fuel constraint, are assumed to not deviate 
greatly from a direct path route. 






lateral separation (ls) 
β 
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B. LATERAL SEPARATION (ls) 
Let ls be defined as the lateral separation of secondary HVUs from the 
perspective of an attacker at rdet. The lateral separation forms the base of an isosceles 
triangle with the two equal legs equal to rdet. Secondary HVUs can lie on the ray 
indicated with a dashed line. In order to allow a defender its maximum engagement 
potential, secondary HVUs should be placed along the ray with angles greater than β. We 
will now determine the angle Φ and the minimum angle β required to ensure the 
maximum effective coverage of a laterally separated HVU from the primary HVU by a 
single defender. The angle β is referenced from the center of the threat sector.  First, note 
the triangle denoted by the bolded lines below and add variable x and angles γ and ω to 

















    
Figure 11 - Effective Threat Sector Calculations I 
 













ω = 90˚ - γ     Eq [23] 
β = ω + θ     Eq [24] 
 
The variable x is half the distance between points 1 and 3 and can be 
approximated by the following: 
 
   x = sin γ x (rdet – cd)    Eq [25] 
 
We next utilize the triangle in the following figure denoted by bolded lines. We 

















Figure 12 - Effective Threat Sector Calculations II 
 














We can see from the above figure that Φ is the sum of angle θ plus 2τ: 
 
   Φ = θ + 2τ     Eq [27] 
 
Additional HVUs can be protected in this scenario so long as they stay in the 


















Figure 13 - Shadow Region 
 
In summary, this section determines how lateral separation requirements affect 
the effective threat sector. It also determines the minimum angle β to allow secondary 
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V.  MODEL FORMULATION: 1 (HVU) x 1(DEFENDER) x p(ATTACKERS) 
 
This section of the formulation focuses on defending the Sea Base against a High 
Density Threat (HDT) attack. 
Although the physical size of the HDT depends on the attackers’ distance from 
one another and the number of attackers, HDTs, by their very definition, imply multiple 
attackers within a limited area or volume. Thus, we shall consider HDTs as if co-located.  
 
A.  MAXIMUM SALVO NUMBER CALCULATION 
Equation [4] is actually an upper bound on Pk as it assumes perfect and 
instantaneous battle damage assessment (BDA) and instantaneous interception by the 
defenders weapon system. The US Navy has been researching directed energy weapons 
in which the assumption of infinite weapon speed would be appropriate. In a more 
traditional scenario where the defender uses a guided missile system, a defender’s fire 
rate can be affected dramatically when BDA and the defender’s weapon time of flight are 
considered.  
Section 1 considers the situation where BDA is instantaneous and focuses on the 
effects of weapon flight time. Section 2 then includes BDA into the formulation. 
 
1. Effects of Weapon Flight Time 
Let us first consider how the defender’s weapon time of flight may affect the 
maximum number of salvos against an incoming attacker.  Naval Operations Analysis 
(1999) aptly describes this situation as the SAM/ASM speed and distance relationships.5 
In this case, SAM (surface-to-air missile) represents the defender’s weapon and ASM 
(anti-ship missile) represents the attacker. To address this relationship, let us define the 
variables that comprise it. 
 rdet = maximum detection range from the defender 
 rmax = maximum intercept range of defender’s weapon system 
 rmin = minimum intercept range of defender’s weapon system 
                                                 
5 Daniel H. Wagner, et. al.ed., Naval Operations Analysis, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
1999, pg. 315-318 
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 vd = velocity of the defender’s weapon system 
 va = velocity of the attacker 
 vin = ( )add vvv +  
 vout = ( )add vvv −  
 ti = time between ith launch and ith intercept 







 xi = distance of ith intercept from the defender 






Figure 14 - Salvo Calculations 
 
Assume that an incoming attacker is detected beyond the maximum intercept 
range (rdet > rmax) and that at x1 = rmax it is intercepted. At this time, the second salvo is 
launched. Since both the defender’s weapon and the attacker have finite velocities, the 
second intercept will take place at some point x2 which lies between x1 and the defender. 
If the defender’s weapon travels to x2  by time t2, it follows that the attacker travels a 
distance x1 – x2 during the same time period t2 which yields the following: 
   22 xtvd =         






==     Eq [28] 
Solving for x2, 












=    
 
x2 x1 rmin.  •   •   •   x3
x1 – x2 
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Thus,  invxx 12 =      Eq [29] 
 
If the attacker is not killed at x1, the defender will fire a third salvo.  
   33 xtvd =         
323 xxtva −=       






==      





=     Eq [30] 
 
Substituting Eq [29] into Eq [30] yields, 
  213 invxx =  
 






ini vxx      Eq [31] 
 
If the defender’s weapons system has a minimum range (rmin), then the intercept 
point of the ith salvo xi must be greater or equal to rmin. Thus, the maximum number of 
salvos a defender can fire at an incoming attacker can be found by setting xi equal to rmin. 
 
   minrxi =      Eq [32] 
 
Substituting Eq [32] into Eq [31] yields, 




invxr      Eq [33] 
 
We now solve for i by use of logarithms, 









lnln maxmin +1   Eq [34] 
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Here,    denotes the floor of the expression since fractional salvos are not 
possible.  
 
If the attacker’s speed is greater than the defender’s weapon system’s speed, then 
no further engagements can occur against an outbound attacker. However, if this is not 
the case, then the defender will be able to fire iout number of salvos. First, to determine 
iout, let the initial salvo begin at the x1 = rmin point. At this time, the second salvo is 
launched. If the defender’s weapon travels to x2  by time t2, it follows that the attacker 
travels a distance x1 - rmin during the same time period t2 which yields the following: 
   22 xtvd =         






==      Eq [35] 
 
Solving for x2, 












=    
 
Thus,  outvxx 12 =       Eq [36] 
 
Subsequent engagements follow the same sequence as Eq [30] through Eq [33] 
except for exchanging rmax and vin with rmin and vout. Additionally, the value of rmax in the 
outbound case depends on the distance between the defender and HVU. If the HVU is far 
enough away from the defender, the missile’s fuel capacity determines rmax. If the HVU 
and the defender are positioned close to each other, then their separation distance 
determines rmax.  
 
Let, 
 d = distance between the defender and HVU 
 rweap = maximum weapon travel range  (fuel dependent) 
 27
Thus, 
 rmax = min(d, rweap) 
 
and, 
   



















  Eq [37] 
 
Thus the total number of possible salvos is given by, 
outintotal iii +=  
  ( ) ( )( )

















rri   Eq [38] 
 
2. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)  
Let us now consider a situation where the defender can uniquely track each 
attacker that comprises the HDT by radar.  The defender can be argued to have a 100% 
BDA capability since it can determine the success or failure of an engagement by 
observing a decrease or constancy in the number of attackers in the HDT. However, this 
BDA will not be instantaneous. A radar system will normally maintain a killed track in its 
system for a few seconds while it confirms that the track is actually no longer present or 
just temporarily lost from detection. In addition, the presence of debris may temporary 
clutter the defender’s radar system, displaying several unimportant targets. An attacker 
can produce debris if engaged successfully by a defender’s munitions. Debris can also be 
produced by the defender’s munitions (i.e., high explosive warhead delivered by missile) 
irrespective of the engagement result. In the presence of debris, the defender will not be 
able to accurately discern the number of attackers in the HDT from the unimportant 
targets, thereby preventing the defender from determining the success or failure of the 
engagement. However, debris will eventually be dropped from the radar system due to 
impact with the ground or ocean or by computer algorithms that consider velocity vectors 
and remove unimportant targets. An algorithm may, for example, identify targets as 
debris that have small velocities and/or are decreasing rapidly in altitude, and remove 
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them from the system. Thus, only after some BDA time has expired will the radar system 
be able to resolve the number of attackers in the HDT, and thereby eventually allow a 
defender to determine the effectiveness of a particular engagement. Let τ denote the time 
required for BDA. If the defender waits for BDA before conducting another engagement, 
then the attacker will continue to advance during this time. To explore the effects of BDA 
on itotal, let us again consider the SAM/ASM speed and distance relationship with the 
addition of three more variables. 
 
 τ = time required for BDA 
yi = distance from defender at the i+1 salvo launch 








Figure 15 - Salvo Calculations with BDA 
 
Previously, it was assumed that a defender having failed to kill an attacker at xi, 
would immediately launch another salvo. Thus, the attacker would travel a distance of xn 
- xn+1 while the defender’s weapon travels to xi+1 during the same time period. However, 
if we consider the time required for BDA, then the attacker will travel a distance of τ va 
from xi before the defender fires. Let δ denote this distance. 
   δ = τ va 
 
Thus, after an intercept at x1 = rmax, the defender will wait τ time units to confirm 
a success or failure before launching another salvo. If the attacker is killed at x1, then no 
further intercept takes place. If the attacker survives the intercept at x1, it will travel 
x2 x1 rmin •  •  • x3 y1y2y3
δ  y1 – x2 
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distance δ towards the defender while the defender awaits BDA before a subsequent 
salvo is launched and is given by the following:  
  δ−= 11 xy      Eq [39] 
 
Thus, Eq [28] is modified to account for BDA. 
   22 xtvd =         






==     Eq [40] 
 
Solving for x2, 












=    
Thus,  invyx 12 =      Eq [41] 
 
Substituting Eq [39] into Eq [41] yields, 
   invxx )( 12 δ−=     Eq [42] 
 
If the attacker is not killed at x2, the defender will again wait τ time units for BDA 
before firing a second salvo allowing the attacker to travel another distance of δ.  
   2 2y x δ= −      Eq [43] 
   33 xtvd =         
323 xytva −=       






==      










Substituting Eq [42] and Eq [43] into Eq [44] yields, 
  inin vvxx δδ −−= 213 )(  
 




ini vvvvxx δδ  Eq [45] 
 
Since )...( 221 −+++ iininin vvv  is a geometric series, it can be expressed as, 














221    Eq [46] 
 
Substituting Eq [47] into Eq [46] yields, 


















1 δδ    Eq [47] 
Equating xi to rmin and solving for 1−iinv  yields, 













min1    Eq [48] 
 
Using logarithms to solve for i yields, 





















− +  
− − +  
= +    
  Eq [49]   
The outbound case with BDA can be solved in a similar manner as the inbound 
case with BDA with minor adjustments. As mentioned previously, an outbound case is 
only feasible if the defender’s weapon speed is greater than the attacker’s speed. In the 
outbound case, let the initial intercept occur at x1 = rmin. If the attacker is killed, there are 
no further intercepts. If the attacker survives, then it will travel distance δ away from the 
defender while the defender awaits BDA before a subsequent launch and is given by: 
 
   δ+= 11 xy      Eq [50] 
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Thus, Eq [35] is modified to account for the outbound case with BDA. 
   22 xtvd =         






==     Eq [51] 
 
Solving for x2, 












=    
 
Thus,   outvyx 12 =       
   outvxx )( 12 δ+=     Eq [52] 
 





outi vvvvxx δδ  Eq [53] 
 
Substituting Eq [46] into Eq [53] yields, 


















1 δδ    Eq [54] 
 
Equating xi to rmax and solving for 1−ioutv  yields, 













max1    Eq [55] 
 
















































  Eq [56] 
  
 





































































 Eq [57] 
 
B.  HDT PROBABILITY OF KILL WITH MARKOV CHAINS 
If a single shot probability of kill is given as p, then the probability that the 
attacker survives is 1-p. Assuming independence, if there are two attackers and two 
rounds in a salvo with each directed at a different attacker, then the probability that both 
attackers survive the salvo is (1-p) * (1-p). The probability that only one is killed is the 
probability the first attacker is killed and the second attacker survives, plus the 
probability the first attacker survives and the second attacker is killed: [(1-p) * p] + [p * 
(1-p)]. Accordingly, the probability that both attackers are killed is p * p.  A Markov 
chain whose state is the number of surviving attackers (T) results from these observations 
with transition matrix A as shown in Figure 16.  
 
Let T = alive attackers 






Alive Attackers after Salvo 
 5T 4T 3T 2T 1T 0T 
5T (1-p)2 2[(1-p) p] p2 0 0 0 
4T 0 (1-p)2 2[(1-p) p] p2 0 0 
3T 0 0 (1-p)2 2[(1-p) p] p2 0 
2T 0 0 0 (1-p)2 2[(1-p) p] p2 
1T 0 0 0 0 (1-p) p 
0T 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Figure 16 – Transition Matrix A for Salvo Calculations 
 
In Figure 16, each horizontal row shows the transition possibilities. Zeroes in the 
cell denote the inability to transition into the column from the row. For example, if the 
state is 5T, and the defender has only a two round salvo capability, the probability of 
transitioning from 5T to 2T, 1T, or 0T is zero. Similarly, if the initial state is 3T, then the 
probability of transitioning to 4T or 5T is zero since we assume that killed attackers 
cannot come back alive. In addition, it is assumed in this model that the defender 
launches its maximum round for every salvo, except only as many rounds as attackers if 
there are fewer attackers than the defender’s maximum capacity. For example, a defender 
will launch a 2 missile salvo so long as there are at least 2 attackers. If there is only 1 
attacker, then only one missile will be launched. This parameter can be adjusted for 
different tactics. To calculate the state transition distribution after n salvos, take VAn 
where A is the state transition matrix and V is [1, 0, 0, …]. This distribution can then be 
compared to operational requirements for adequacy. Thus, the model can provide the 
commander the probability of successfully killing a certain number of attackers after n 
salvos. In addition, the model can provide the number of salvos required in order to 
achieve a certain probability of success. 
 
C.  TYPE I AND TYPE II ERRORS 
Let us define a Type I error as when a defender believes an attacker is alive but is 
actually killed. A Type II error is when a defender believes an attacker is killed but is 





















because a “killed” ship may not sink instantly if at all. Subsequently, a damaged ship can 
give the appearance of being “killed”, but still be combat capable. For example, during 
the Battle of Coral Sea, USS LEXINGTON and YORKTOWN took heavy torpedo and 
bomb hits. The Japanese reported both as sunk when actually the YORKTOWN received 
only light damage and the YORKTOWN maintained its 25 knot steaming capability and 
continued flight operations.6 In a modern air warfare scenario, it is difficult for Type I 
and II errors to be made. BDA for an air target can be made either visually or by radar. 
For visual BDA, an attacker can be evaluated as “killed” when it is observed to have 
made contact with a missile or other munitions and explodes. It can also be observed as 
“killed” if after contact with a munition, it loses control and impacts the ground or sea. 
Similarly, an air target can be visually evaluated as “alive” if the munition is observed to 
have missed, or the air target continues to fly in a controlled manner. For BDA with 
radar, an air target can be evaluated as “killed” if it no longer returns electromagnetic 
(EM) pulse either due to explosion or impact with the ground or sea. In either case, Type 
II error is difficult since air targets that have exploded or impacted the surface will 
normally not be evaluated as “alive”. Similarly, Type I error is difficult since an “alive” 
air target that is still flying cannot give the appearance of exploding or impacting the 
surface without actually doing so.7 Thus, for the analyses in this model, we will assume 
no Type I or II errors. 
 
D. MISSILE FIRING POLICIES AGAINST HDTs  
HDTs add another layer of complication to defense at sea. The factors that go into 
successfully killing a small, incoming raid of attackers include such things as single-shot 
probability of kill, probability of detection, detection time or range, velocity vectors, and 
the number of shots. The number of shots can be driven by a weapon’s maximum and 
minimum ranges, and velocity vectors, as described in Eq [57]. As the number of 
attackers that comprise the HDT grows larger, the total number of engagements plays an 
increasingly important role in determining the level of success a defender may have 
against the attackers.  With HDTs, if the number of attackers exceeds the number of 
                                                 
6 Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, New York: The Free Press, 1985, pg. 162 
7 Stealth aircraft may be able to hide from radar, however, this capability is constant and cannot be turned 
on and off to give a defender’s radar the appearance of it having exploded or crashed. 
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engagements, then the probability of successfully killing the entire raid is zero. For 
example, if a HDT is comprised of 10 attackers and there are only 4 opportunities to fire 
a one round salvo, a defender can at most kill 4 attackers. If a defender can fire a two 
round salvo as current capabilities allow, and each missile is directed at a different 
attacker, a defender can at most kill 8 attackers. If each salvo is directed at a single 
attacker, then again, at most only 4 attackers can be killed. Therefore, this section will 
explore strategies a defender might employ to increase the number of engagements 
against HDTs.  
One method might be to increase the fire rate of the defender or the salvo size. 
However, some ships already have missile fire intervals of only a few seconds. The Mk-
13 Guided Missile Launching System (GMLS) on current US Navy frigates has a 
continuous fire interval of 8.09 seconds.8 As for salvo size, with the advent of the 
Vertical Launch System (VLS), each missile is already in its launch canister poised for 
near simultaneous firing9, easily accommodating potentially large salvo sizes. However, 
current fire rate and salvo size tend to be more a function of the number of available fire 
control (FC) radars. In other words, a defender’s salvo size can be limited by the number 
of fire control (FC) radars it possesses. One reason is that some EM seeking missiles 
require continuous illumination from launch to intercept. If a ship with three FC radars 
launches a three-missile salvo, a subsequent salvo cannot be launched until the FC radars 
have completed guiding the previous salvo to termination.  
The Aegis combat system, however, can be argued to have overcome this 
limitation since it uses a search radar (SPY-1) to provide mid-course guidance to a 
missile. Thus, a FC radar is only required to illuminate an attacker at the terminal phase 
of the intercept, allowing more missiles than FC radars to be in flight. This would allow a 
ship equipped with the Aegis combat system to better utilize its faster rate of fire since a 
missile launch does not require a free FC radar. However, this capability can be rendered 
ineffective if SPY-1 tracking resolution is not high. If the attackers in the HDT have 
small radar cross sections (RCS) and are relatively close to one another, SPY-1 may not 
be able to completely resolve one or more attackers as individual tracks. Currently, the 
                                                 
8 http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk13-gmls.pdf, 19NOV03 
9 http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/an-spy-1.htm, 19NOV03 
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SPY-1 weapon control system (WCS) does not allow subsequent salvos against a specific 
target track until it has been evaluated as killed.10 Thus, in the worst case where SPY-1 
sees a HDT as a single target, the system behaves as if under the requirement for 
continuous illumination, thereby countering SPY-1’s multiple in-flight salvo capability. 
Although it may still be possible for a defender to fire a large salvo against this 
aggregated HDT, because of the narrow beam of the FC radar, the salvo will tend to 
converge on the single attacker that happens to be illuminated in the group. This may 
increase the probability of kill for that single target, but will have minimal effect on the 
HDT as a whole. 
 
1. Broad vs. Narrow Beam FC Radar 
Given the situation where a HDT is seen as a single target, a defender may want 
to explore an alternative means of maximizing the potential number of engagements. One 
such alternative may be to modify FC radars to accommodate a wider beam.   
 
Figure 17 - Mk 92 Fire Control System11 
                                                 
10 http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/an-spy-1.htm, 19NOV03 
11 http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/an-spy-1.htm, 19NOV03 
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Currently, FC radars are used to focus narrow beams of electromagnetic (EM) 
energy at a single target for illumination. Illumination is the process by which high 
frequency EM energy is reflected off a target. An EM seeking missile then detects this 
reflected energy and homes in on that target. The FC energy beams are narrow to ensure 
that other objects that may be nearby, such as friendly aircraft, are not unintentionally 










Figure 18 - Narrow Beam Engagement 
 
2.  Narrow Beam Model 
Using FC radars with a narrow beam, the defender will direct its FC radar at the 
HDT. The narrow beam FC radar will choose only one attacker. The defender then fires a 
salvo at this attacker, waits for intercept, and then moves on to fire at the next randomly 
chosen attacker without waiting for BDA. The defender will continue to fire at the HDT 
in this manner, of course skipping over attackers that have been killed and dropped from 
the system, until the entire HDT is killed. The defender must decide how many missiles 
to shoot on each salvo depending on:  
(1) remaining salvos,  
(2) remaining missiles, and  











p = single shot probability of kill of a defender’s weapon 
q = 1- p 
s = number of remaining salvos 
a = number of attackers remaining before a salvo 
y = number of attackers remaining after a salvo 
x = number of weapons fired in a salvo 
 w = number of remaining weapons in inventory  
EVN(s, w, a) = maximum expected number of attackers killed if there are s 
remaining salvos, w remaining weapons, and a attackers (Narrow 
Beam) 
PN(a, x, y) = probability of having y remaining attackers after firing x missiles at a 
attackers in a single salvo (Narrow Beam)  
 
If a defender decides to fire x missiles at a attackers s salvos remaining, then the 
defender will have, w – x weapons, either y or y -1 attackers, and s-1 salvos remaining.  
This process is continued until either salvos, weapons or alive attackers are 
exhausted. This process is then repeated for all possible values of x, y and s.  
To find the average number of attackers killed after s salvos,  
 
EVN(s, w, a) = ( )0
1




P a x y a y EV s w x y≤ ≤
= −
 















N    Eq [59] 
The above algorithm is recursive and is explored through use of a computer. The 
optimal distribution of missiles is stored in an array.12 An extended example is given in 
section 4 below. 
The disadvantage of a narrow beam FC radar is that the number of attackers that 
can be fired on can be limited by the number of salvos. If the number of attackers in the 
                                                 
12 This algorithm was implemented in Java and can be found in Appendix A. 
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HDT is larger than the number of salvos, a defender will not be able to fire at all attackers 
in the HDT. 
 
3. Wide Beam Model 
Instead of a narrow beam illuminating just a single attacker, conceptually a wide 












Figure 19 - Wide Beam Engagement 
 
This model is similar to the Narrow Beam model except, since multiple attackers 
are illuminated, a large salvo will not tend to converge on just a single attacker. Let us 
assume that each missile chooses an attacker uniformly, randomly, and independently of 
the others. The missile then kills its chosen attacker with probability p13. Firing in this 
manner carries the risk of waste, since some missiles may choose attackers already killed 
by other missiles, but it also permits large salvo sizes to be spread over multiple attackers 
at each salvo. 
First let us calculate the probability distribution for having y remaining attackers 
in a salvo size of x missiles directed against a attackers. 
 
                                                 
13 This situation can be described as the Urn model. Kress, Moshe, Class Notes, Advanced Combat Models, 







EVW (s, w, a) = maximum expected number of attackers killed if there are s 
remaining salvos, w remaining weapons, and a attackers (Wide 
Beam) 
PW(a, x, y) = probability of having y remaining attackers after firing x missiles at 
a attackers in a single salvo (Wide Beam)  
(other variables as defined for the Narrow Beam Model) 
 
If 0 ≤ y ≤ a, we have Eq [60]: 
 




































111,, 4444 34444 214444 3444 21
444 3444 21
    
Where, 
(1) is the binomial probability that j out of x missiles randomly choose the 
last attacker. 
 (2) qj is the probability that the last attacker survives the j missiles, in 
which case there must be y-1 survivors among the a-1 attackers that are fired on by x - j 
missiles.  
(3) (1 - qj) is the probability that the last attacker is killed by the j missiles, 
in which case there must be y survivors among the a-1 attackers that are fired on by x - j 
missiles.  
Now that we have the probability distribution given the number of remaining 
salvos, missiles, and attackers, we can now evaluate the expected number of attackers 
killed (EV) by substituting this probability distribution (Eq [60]) into Eq [58] and 
exploring all possible combinations of salvos, missiles, and attackers.  












4. Narrow vs. Wide Beam Model Comparison 
 In this section, a comparison of the two models is conducted by utilizing the 
algorithm for EV (Eq [58] and Eq [61]). Figures 20-27 list the recommended salvo size x 
[s, w, a], given the remaining salvos, weapons, and attackers. The left vertical column 
indicates the weapons remaining and top horizontal row indicates the number of 
remaining attackers. 
 
a.  Narrow Beam Model Example 
Let  s = 4, w = 13, a = 10,  p = 0.75 
 
 s = 4   y     
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
w 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 7 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 8 8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 9 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 10 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 11 11 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 12 12 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 13 13 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Figure 20 – Recommended Salvo Size (x) (Narrow Beam) 
 
The recommended number of missiles to fire in this first salvo is 4, which 












 s = 3   y     
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
w 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 9 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Figure 21 – Recommended Salvo Size (x) (Narrow Beam) 
 
In the second salvo, the number of remaining attackers can vary from 9 to 
10 depending on whether the previously selected attacker was killed. The recommended 
number of missiles to fire in this salvo is 3 in both cases, which will again converge on a 
single randomly chosen attacker. 
 
 s = 2   y     
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
w 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 6 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Figure 22 – Recommended Salvo Size (x) (Narrow Beam) 
 
 
 s = 1   y     
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
w 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Figure 23 – Recommended Salvo Size (x) (Narrow Beam) 
 
Since this is the last salvo, the defender fires whatever is remaining in its 
inventory to achieve the largest expected number of attackers killed.  
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Using Eq [61], the expected number of killed attackers is,   
EVN = 3.95 
 
Generally, a defender implementing the Narrow Beam model will attempt 
to evenly distribute its weapons inventory over all salvos. 
 
b.  Wide Beam Model Example 
Let  s = 4, w = 13, a = 10, p = 0.75 
 s = 4   y     
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 7 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
w 8 8 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 
 9 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 10 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 11 11 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 
 12 12 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 13 13 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Figure 24 - Recommended Salvo Size (x) (Wide Beam) 
 
The recommended number of missiles to fire in this first salvo is 4.  
 s = 3   y     
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
w 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 6 6 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 
 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 9 9 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
Figure 25 - Recommended Salvo Size (x) (Wide Beam) 
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The recommended number of missiles to fire in the second salvo is 3 or 4 
depending on the number of attackers that were killed in the preceding salvos. 
 
 s = 2   y     
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
w 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 6 6 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Figure 26 - Recommended Salvo Size (x) (Wide Beam) 
 
The recommended number of missiles to fire in the third salvo is 3.  
 s = 1   y     
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
w 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Figure 27 - Recommended Salvo Size (x) (Wide Beam) 
 
As in the Narrow Beam model, the defender fires whatever is remaining in 
its inventory in the last salvo so long as there are alive attackers.  
 
Using Eq [61], the expected number of killed attackers is,   
EVW = 8.38 
  
Thus, under the condition when  s < w, s < a, xg = s, and xu = w, the Wide Beam 
model will always outperform the Narrow Beam model. The compelling reason for using 
the Wide Beam model in this situation is due to the possibility for the defender to fire 
each salvo at multiple attackers, while only one attacker can be engaged in the Narrow 
Beam model. When s ≥ w, the two models perform equivalently. In this case, both 




VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
This section will provide numerical examples of the concepts developed in the 
previous sections to illustrate possible insights this model may provide to commanders 
and system designers in Sea Base Defense.  
 
A. DETERMINING MAX THREAT SECTOR 
EXAMPLE 1: To determine the maximum threat sector and number of defenders 
required. 
Given: 
Attacker speed 500 kts 
Defender speed 30 kts 
Detection range 200 nm 
Weapons range 30 nm 
 
Using Eq [6]:  vrel  = vtar - vdef 
    = 500kts – 30kts 
    = 470kts 
 
Using Eq [7]:  tmax  = 2 x rweap / vrel 
    = 2 x 30nm / 470kts 
    = 0.1277 hrs 
 
Using Eq [11]: cd  = rweap [ 1 + 2 / (µ –1 ) ]    ( µ = vtar / vdef ) 
    = 30nm[1 + 2 / ( (500kts/30kts) – 1)] 
    = 33.83nm 
 
Using Eq [12]: atd  = rdet – (cd + rweap)    
    = 200nm – (33.83nm + 30nm) 





Using Eq [13]: t0   =  atd / vtar  
    = 136.17nm / 500kts 
    = 0.2723 hrs 
 
Using Eq [14]: dtd  =  t0  x vdef  
    = 0.2723 hrs x 30kts 
    = 8.17nm 
 
Using Eq [20]: θmax  = sin-1 ( dtd / cd ) 
    = sin-1 ( 8.17nm /33.83nm ) 
    = 13.98˚ 
 
In this case, solving for θmax yields 13.98° or a threat sector coverage of 
approximately 28°.  From this, we can now broaden our model to include n defenders. By 
dividing 360° by the maximum threat sector coverage, the minimum number of defenders 
required for all around coverage without overlap is approximately 13.  The case for 
overlap is discussed further in the section Model Limitations and Areas for Further 
Analysis. 
 
B. DETERMINING PROBABILITY OF KILL (SINGLE ATTACKER) 
EXAMPLE 2: To determine the probability of kill 
Given: 
Attacker speed 500 kts 
Defender speed 30 kts 
Detection range 200 nm 
Weapons range 30 nm 
λ 50 shots/hr 
p 0.4  
 
Using Eq [6]:  tmax  = 2 x rweap / vrel 
(from example 1)  = 2 x 30nm / 470kts 
    = 0.1277 hrs 
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Using Eq [8]:  n  = λ x tmax      
    = 50 shots/hr x 0.1277 hrs 
    = 6.38 salvos  
 
Using Eq [4]:  Pk  = 1 -  e-λpt  
    = [ 1 – e –50*(0.4)*(0.1277) ] 
    = 0.9222  
 
Hence, if the defender has a single shot probability of kill of 40%, then the 
probability of an attacker being killed during the engagement is approximately 92%.  
 
1.  Effect of Kill Probability on Threat Sector 
EXAMPLE 3: To determine the effect of probability of kill on maximum threat 
sector. 
Building from Example 2, if the desired probability of kill after the completion of 
the entire engagement is 80%, then the number of salvos can be calculated by solving for 
n.  
 
Using Eq [4]:  Pk = 1 -  e-λpt   
e-λpt = 1– Pk 
t = – log(1 – Pk) / λp 
     = – log(1 – 0.80)/(50*0.4) 
  = 0.08 hrs 
 
Using Eq [10]: ad  = vdef  x  t 
    = 30kts x 0.08hrs 





Using Eq [9]:  cd  = rweap + ad    
    = 30nm + 2.4nm 
    = 32.4nm 
 
Using Eq [12]: rengage  = cd + rweap    
   atd  = rdet – rengage    
    = 200nm – (32.4nm + 30nm) 
    = 137.6nm 
 
Using Eq [13]: t0   =  atd / vtar  
    = 137.6nm / 500kts 
    = 0.2752 hrs 
 
Using Eq [14]: dtd  =  t0  x vdef  
    = 0.2752 hrs x 30kts 
    = 8.256nm 
 
Using Eq [20]: θmax  = sin-1 ( dtd / cd ) 
    = sin-1 ( 8.256nm / 32.4nm ) 
    = 14.76˚ 
 
Reducing our probability of kill requirement from 95% to 80% shortened our cd 
and allowed larger flexibility in threat sector coverage by a single defender from 28˚ to 
about 30˚ (2 x 14.76˚). Thus, the model provided some insight into the effect of changing 
the probability of kill and in this scenario showed that relatively large changes in Pk 







C.  EFFECT OF DETECTION RANGE 
EXAMPLE 4: To determine the effect of detection range on maximum threat 
sector 
The effect of degradation of radar range due to combat damage or atmospherics 
can potentially reduce the maximum threat sector coverage by a single defender. In the 
same light, newer and more robust radar systems that increase radar detection range can 
increase the maximum threat sector coverage. For example, let the new radar detection 
range (rdet) be 250nm vice 200nm and the other parameters the same as in Example 1. 
 
Using Eq [12]: rengage  = cd + rweap    
   atd  = rdet – rengage    
    = 250nm – (33.83nm + 30nm) 
    = 186.17nm 
 
Using Eq [13]: t0   =  atd / vtar  
    = 186.17nm / 500kts 
    = 0.3723 hrs 
 
Using Eq [14]: dtd  =  t0  x vdef  
    = 0.3723 hrs x 30kts 
    = 11.17nm 
 
Using Eq [20]: θmax  = sin-1 ( dtd / cd ) 
    = sin-1 ( 11.17nm / 33.83nm ) 
    = 19.28˚ 
 
Hence, an increase in the radar detection range by 50nm (from 200nm to 250nm) 
yielded a 5.3° increase in θmax from 13.98° (Exercise 1) to 19.28°. The resulting 
maximum threat coverage sector by a single defender which is 2 x θmax is now 38.56° 
vice 20° (Exercise 1).  Subsequently, the HVU now only requires 10 defenders for 360° 
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coverage without overlap. This is a reduction by 3 defenders from our original case with 
rdet equal to 200nm.  
 
D.  EFFECT OF LATERAL SEPARATION AMONG HVUS 
EXAMPLE 5: To determine the effect of lateral separation of HVUs on threat 
sector and HVU placement 
 
Given: 
Attacker speed 500 kts 
Defender speed 30 kts 
Detection range 200 nm 
Weapons range 30 nm 
Threat Sector 20° (θ =10°)
Lateral Separation 10 nm 
cd 33.83 nm 
 
Since the first four parameters are the same as in Exercise 1, we will use some 
results from Exercise 1 to avoid unnecessary recalculations. The new parameter in this 
scenario is for the HVUs to maintain at least 10nm lateral separation from each other. We 
shall examine the effect of this new requirement on threat sector coverage capabilities of 
defenders, and on secondary HVU placement.  
 
Using Eq [22]: γ  = arcsin [ (ls / 2) / rdet ] 
    = arcsin [ (10nm / 2) / 200nm ] 
    = 1.43˚ 
 
Using Eq [25]: x = sin γ x (rdet – cd)   *cd value from Exercise 1 
    = sin (1.43˚) x (200nm – 33.83nm) 
    = 4.15nm 
 
Using Eq [26]: τ  = arcsin ( x / cd ) 
    = arcsin ( 4.15nm / 33.83nm) 
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    = 7.05° 
 
Using Eq [27]: Φ  = θ + 2τ 
    = 10° + 2 (7.05°)     
    = 24.10° 
Assuming symmetry on either side of the primary HVU, the defender must now 
be able to defend the effective threat sector which is 2 Φ or 48.2° for at least 3 HVUs.  
 
E. DETERMINING SALVO REQUIREMENTS 
EXAMPLE 6: To determine the number of salvos required for a certain level of 
Pk against HDT 
 
Given:  HDT of 10 attackers  
Defender has a three round salvo capability  
p = 0.6 
 
Our state transition matrix A is as shown below. 
 
Salvo 1 10T 9T 8T 7T 6T 5T 4T 3T 2T 1T 0T 
10T 0.064 0.288 0.432 0.216 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9T 0 0.064 0.288 0.432 0.216 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8T 0 0 0.064 0.288 0.432 0.216 0 0 0 0 0 
7T 0 0 0 0.064 0.288 0.432 0.216 0 0 0 0 
6T 0 0 0 0 0.064 0.288 0.432 0.216 0 0 0 
5T 0 0 0 0 0 0.064 0.288 0.432 0.216 0 0 
4T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.064 0.288 0.432 0.216 0 
3T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.064 0.288 0.432 0.216 
2T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.16 0.48 0.36 
1T 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 







The five-salvo transition matrix is A5: 
 
 Salvo 5 10T 0K 9T 1K 8T 2K 7T 3K 6T 4K 5T 5K 4T 6K 3T 7K 2T 8K 1T 9K 0T 10K 
10T 0K 2.8E-10 1E-08 1.7E-07 1.9E-06 1.5E-05 9.1E-05 0.00043 0.00166 0.00921 0.09189 0.89669 
9T 1K 0 2.8E-10 1E-08 1.7E-07 1.9E-06 1.5E-05 9.1E-05 0.00043 0.00347 0.0579 0.9381 
8T 2K 0 0 2.8E-10 1E-08 1.7E-07 1.9E-06 1.5E-05 9.1E-05 0.00115 0.03482 0.96392 
7T 3K 0 0 0 2.8E-10 1E-08 1.7E-07 1.9E-06 1.5E-05 0.00034 0.02033 0.97931 
6T 4K 0 0 0 0 2.8E-10 1E-08 1.7E-07 1.9E-06 9.3E-05 0.01162 0.98828 
5T 5K 0 0 0 0 0 2.8E-10 1E-08 1.7E-07 2.3E-05 0.00657 0.9934 
4T 6K 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.8E-10 1E-08 5.8E-06 0.00378 0.99621 
3T 7K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.8E-10 1.3E-06 0.00196 0.99804 
2T 8K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.3E-07 0.00131 0.99869 
1T 9K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00066 0.99934 
0T 10K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Thus, in a scenario with a HDT of 10 attackers, a defender with a 3 round salvo 
capability, and a single shot probability of kill of 0.6, a minimum of 5 salvos are required 
for an approximately 90% probability of successfully killing all ten attackers. Similarly, 
if the HDT is comprised of only 8 attackers, the defender has a 96.39% chance of killing 
all 8 attackers. Further comparisons can easily be done by varying the defender’s 





VII.  MODEL LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 
 
A. DIRECT OVERFLIGHT OF ATTACKERS 
Calculations were based on the assumption that the defender is able to position 
itself such that the attacker directly overflies the defender. Of course, with modern air 
defense ranges well beyond 50 nm or more, strict overhead flight is not a requirement. In 
such cases, a modification can be made to the engagement area, so that calculations for 
probability of kill take into consideration angled approaches across the engagement zone. 
Naval Operational Analysis discusses engagement of targets when not flying directly 
overhead.14 
 
B.  CALCULATIONS FOR MULTIPLE DEFENDERS 
A defender may be able to engage attackers beyond the effective coverage sector, 
albeit at less than the maximum level. Since multiple defenders need not exclusively 
engage attackers, these degraded but overlapping coverage sectors by two or more 
defenders could also achieve an effective defense. 
 
                                                 
14 Daniel H. Wagner, et. al.ed., Naval Operations Analysis, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
1999, ch. 13 
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Figure 28 – Separate Coverage Zones 
 
Combined, the two defenders have a 50° effective coverage area (Figure 29). 
Although this model does not currently take into account the effects of overlapping 

































Figure 29 – Combined Coverage Zone 
 
C.  MOVING HVUS 
Although there may be situations where the HVUs (i.e. EXWAR ship) must stay 
relatively stationary during sea based operations such as launching and recovering 
aircraft or watercraft, it is conceivable that the HVUs will have some freedom of mobility 
most of the time. This model could be modified to accommodate HVU movement by also 
calculating a HVU travel distance (htd) in a similar manner as the defender travel 
distance (dtd). If it is assumed that the HVU moves directly away from the direction of 
the threat’s approach, this could possibly shorten the time/distance problem for the 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
As expeditionary warfare takes on greater prominence in naval operations, the 
defense of the sea base from high density threats becomes vital. Current tactics and 
weapon systems are focused on relatively small raids. Thus, this paper examines the 
critical factors that contribute to the defense of the Sea Base with respect to multiple 
HVUs against HDTs. The paper focuses primarily on the following factors:  
(1) defender placement relative to threat and HVU positions,  
(2) defender weapons speed,  
(3) defender weapons inventory,  
(4) defender weapons range,  
(5) defender weapons single shot probability of kill,  
(6) HDT size,  
(7) HDT speed,  
(8) threat sector size,  
(9) number of HVUs, and  
(10) placement of HVUs relative to threat and defenders positions.  
 
From a development standpoint, the calculations developed in chapters III-V can 
be used by Systems Engineers to perform trade off studies during ship or weapon system 
production. From an operational standpoint, the calculations can be used by a commander 
charged with the Sea Base defense to utilize his given assets in the most efficient manner. 
For example, the Wide Beam missile firing policy algorithm in Chapter V could be 
programmed into a defender’s combat system to respond automatically with the 
appropriate salvo size or provide a recommendation to a commander for asset allocation. 
 The study is divided into three phases, each building on the previous phase. Phase 
I considers the scenario with a single HVU, a single defender, and a single attacker. This 
phase describes the fundamental relationships that comprise Sea Base defense and 
provides a methodology to determine the maximum sector a single defender can cover 
within the constraints of factors 1, 2, 4, 7, and 8. Phase II explores the effect of having 
multiple HVUs on defense of the Sea Base with particular emphasis on threat sector 
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coverage and HVU placement. Finally, Phase III examines the effect of having multiple 
attackers on Sea Base defense. In particular, the third phase looks at current capabilities 
and limitations of weapon systems and tactics against HDTs through a comparative 
analysis with a modified weapons system and tactic. The current system is a narrow beam 
FC radar. The modified system is a FC radar designed for a wide beam illumination of 
multiple targets. The Wide Beam algorithm in conjunction with this modified system 
allows a greater expected number of kills against the HDT. However, this gain is at a cost 
of potentially wasting missile due to possible redundant kills. Although the cost of a 
defender such as a cruiser or destroyer is in the billions of dollars, not to mention the 
invaluable human assets aboard, missiles are not inexpensive and are limited. Thus, the 
benefits of the Wide Beam model must be tempered against the risk of inefficient use of 
valuable assets.  
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XI.  APPENDIX A – EXPECTED VALUE AND SIMULATION CODE 
 
The following is written in Java. 
 
/* 
 * ExpectedValue.java 
 * 





 * Henry S. Kim 
 * LT USN 
 * Comments: This class determines the expected number of killed attackers 
 *           and calculates the optimal firing policy given at each salvo: 
 * 
 *           number of attackers, number of missiles in the defender’s 
 *           inventory, number of salvos, and single-shot probability of kill. 
 *           In addition, this class calculates the optimal firing policy 
 */ 
 
public class ExpectedValue { 
     
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        int s; //variable for salvos left 
        int w; //variable for weapons left 
        int a; //variable for current number of attackers 
        int salvos; //total potential salvos 
        int weapinvent; //weapon’s inventory 
        int attackers; //initial number of attackers 
        int y; //number of remaining attackers 
        int x; //number of weapons assigned 
        int i; //index for number of weapons on first attacker 
        double sumofy; 
        double TempEV; 
        double roundEV; 
        double [][][] EV; 
        double [][][] pfunc; 
        int [][][] StoreX; 
        boolean seeoutput; 
        boolean dofunc; 
        boolean dowide; 
        boolean dosim; 
        boolean seeEVresults; 
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        boolean seeprobdata; 
        boolean seesimoutput; 
        boolean seextable; 
         
        double p; 
        double q; // q = 1-p 
        double qi; 
        double ib; 
        double fac; 
        double pr; 
        double initterm; 
         
        salvos=5; 
        weapinvent=25; 
        attackers=10; 
        p= 0.75; 
         
        dofunc = true; // performs the expected value function 
        dowide = true; // if true perform wide beam, if false does narrow 
        seeoutput = false; // displays intermediate output for debugging 
        seeprobdata = false; // displays probability function results 
        seeEVresults = false; // displays f function results and associated firing  
              // recommendation 
        seextable = true; // displays firing recommendation in table format 
         
        dosim = false; // if true, will run simulation 
        seesimoutput = true; // displays intermediate simulation output for debugging 
         
        EV = new double[salvos+1][weapinvent+1][attackers+1]; 
        pfunc = new double[attackers+1][weapinvent+1][attackers+1]; 
        StoreX = new int[salvos+1][weapinvent+1][attackers+1]; 
         
 
                ///////  FILLING THE PROBABILITY TABLE ////// 
         
        for (a=attackers;a>=0;a--) {  
            for (x=weapinvent;x>=0;x--) {  
                for (y=attackers;y>=0;y--) {  
                    if(a==y) 
                        pfunc[a][x][y] = 1; 
                    else 
                        pfunc[a][x][y] = 0; 
                }  
            }  
        }  
        if (p>0 && weapinvent>0){  
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            q = 1.0 – p; 
            for (a=1;a<=attackers;a++){ 
                for (w=1;w<=weapinvent;w++){ 
                    for (y=0;y<=a;y++){ 
                        if(w+y>=a){ 
                            if(a==1){ 
                                pfunc[1][w][0]=1-Math.pow(q,w); 
                                pfunc[1][w][1]=Math.pow(q,w); 
                            } 
                            else{ 
                                fac=1.0/(a-1.0); 
                                pr = Math.pow((1.0-(1.0/a)),w); 
                                qi = 1.0; 
                                ib=w; 
                                if (y==0) { 
                                    sumofy=0; 
                                } 
                                else { 
                                    sumofy=pr*pfunc[a-1][w][y-1]; 
                                } 
                                for (i = 1;i<=w;i++){ 
                                    pr = pr * fac * ib / i; 
                                    qi = qi * q; 
                                    if(y>0) { 
                                        sumofy += pr*(qi*pfunc[a-1][w-i][y-1]+ 
                                        (1.0-qi)*pfunc[a-1][w-i][y]); 
                                    } 
                                    else { 
                                        sumofy += pr*(1-qi)*pfunc[a-1][w-i][y]; 
                                    } 
                                    ib=ib-1; 
                                }  
                                pfunc[a][w][y]=sumofy; 
                            }  
                        } 
                        if (seeprobdata==true) { 
                            System.out.println(“pfunc[a=”+a+”][w=”+w+”][y=”+y+”]:  
     “+pfunc[a][w][y]); 
                        } 
                    }  
                    if (seeprobdata==true) { 
                        System.out.println(); 
                        System.out.println(); 
                    } 
                } 
            }  
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        } 
         
        //////////////////////// CALCULATION OF FUNCTION EV/////////////////////// 
 
        if (dofunc==true) { 
             
            ////////// INITIALIZING for s = 0 //////////// 
            s=0; 
            for (w=weapinvent;w>=1;w--) { 
                for (a=attackers;a>=1;a--) {  
                    EV[s][w][a] = 0; 
                }  
            }  
            ////////////////////////////////////////////// 
             
            for (s=1;s<=salvos;s++) {  
                for (w=weapinvent;w>=1;w--) {  
                    for (a=attackers;a>=0;a--) {  
                        for (x=w;x>=0;x--) {  
                            sumofy = 0; 
                             
                            for (y=a;y>=0;y--) {  
                                if (dowide==true) {  
                                    sumofy += pfunc[a][x][y]*( (a-y) + EV[s-1][w-x][y]); 
                                }  
                                else {  
                                    if (y==a) { 
                                        sumofy += Math.pow((1-p),x)*( (a-y) + EV[s-1][w-x][y]); 
                                    } 
                                    if (y==(a-1)) { 
                                        sumofy += (1-(Math.pow((1-p),x)))*( (a-y) + EV[s-1][w-x][y]); 
                                    } 
                                }  
                                if (seeoutput == true) { 
                                    System.out.println(“s: “+s+”  w: “+w+”  a: “+a+”  x: “+x+”  y:  
“+y); 
                                    System.out.println(“sumofy: “+sumofy); 
                                } 
                                 
                            }  
                            TempEV = sumofy; 
                            if (seeoutput == true) { 
                                System.out.println(“TempEV: “ +TempEV); 
                            } 
                            if (EV[s][w][a] < TempEV) {  
                                if (seeoutput == true) { 
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                                    System.out.println(“did EV[s][w][a]”); 
                                } 
                                EV[s][w][a] = TempEV; 
                                StoreX[s][w][a] = x; 
                            }  
                        }  
                    }  
                }  
            }  
             
            ///////////// PRINTING OUTPUT ////////////////////// 
            if (seeEVresults==true) {  
                for (s=1;s<=salvos;s++) { 
                    for (w=weapinvent;w>=0;w--) { 
                        for (a=attackers;a>=0;a--){ 
                            roundEV=Math.round(EV[s][w][a]*100.00)/100.00; 
                            System.out.println(“EV[s=”+s+”][w=”+w+”][a=”+a+”]: “+roundEV+”   
    X[s=”+s+”][w=”+w+”][a=”+a+”]: “+StoreX[s][w][a]); 
                        }  
                        System.out.println(); 
                    }  
                    System.out.println(); 
                    System.out.println(); 
                }  
            }  
            if (seextable==true) {  
                for (s=salvos;s>=1;s--) {  
                    System.out.println(“RemainingSalvos:”+s); 
                    System.out.println(); 
                    for (i=0;i<=attackers;i++) { 
                        if (i==attackers) { 
                            System.out.println(i); 
                        } 
                        else { 
                            System.out.print(i+” “); 
                        } 
                    } 
                    for (w=1;w<=weapinvent;w++) {  
                        System.out.print(w+” “); 
                        for (a=1;a<=attackers;a++) {  
                            if (a==attackers) { 
                                System.out.println(StoreX[s][w][a]); 
                            } else { 
                                System.out.print(StoreX[s][w][a]+” “); 
                            } 
                        }  
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                    }  
                    System.out.println(); 
                }  
            }  
        }  
         
        /////////////////            SIMULATION              //////////////////// 
         
        int t; // variable for trials 
        int stages; // variable for number of remaining engagement opportunities 
        int cankill; // possible killed attackers after each stage 
        int killed; // variable for number of attackers killed 
        int trials; // number of trials 
        int shoot; // recommended number of missiles to shoot 
        int totalkilled; // total killed at each stage 
        int cumulative; // cumulative killed after t trial runs 
        double avg; // average killed after t trials 
        double rn; // random number from 0 to 1 
        double [] limit; // limits for probability intervals 
         
         
        limit = new double [weapinvent+1]; 
        trials = 2; 
         
        avg = 0.0; 
        if (dosim==true) {  
            System.out.println(“RUNNING SIMULATION WITH “+trials+” TRIALS”); 
            cumulative = 0; 
            for (t=1; t<=trials;t++) {  
                System.out.println(“      ** TRIAL “+t+” **”); 
                totalkilled = 0; 
                w=weapinvent; 
                a=attackers; 
                for (s=salvos; s>=1; s--) {  
                    shoot = StoreX[s][w][a]; 
                    if (seesimoutput==true) { 
                        System.out.println(“    ---  Salvo “+(salvos+1-s)+”  ---“); 
                        System.out.println(“attackers: “+a+”  weapon inventory: “+w); 
                        System.out.println(“recommend shooting: “+shoot); 
                    } 
                    cankill = Math.min(shoot, a); 
                    if (seesimoutput==true) { 
                        System.out.println(“cankill: “+cankill); 
                    } 
                    for (killed=cankill;killed>=0;killed--) {  
                        if (killed==cankill) {  
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                            if (seesimoutput==true) { 
                                System.out.println(“potential decrease to: “+(a-killed)); 
                            } 
                            limit[killed+1] = 1.0; 
                        } 
                        limit[killed] = limit[killed+1] – pfunc[a][shoot][a-killed]; 
                    }  
                    rn = Math.random(); 
                    for (int interval=0; interval<=cankill; interval++) {  
                        if ( (rn >= limit[interval]) && (rn < limit[interval+1]) ) { 
                            a -= interval; 
                            if (seesimoutput==true) { 
                                System.out.println(“we now fire “+shoot+” missiles”); 
                                System.out.println(interval+” attackers were killed”); 
                                System.out.println(“ New number of attackers is: “+a); 
                            } 
                            totalkilled += interval; 
                        }  
                    }  
                    w -= shoot; 
                }  
                cumulative += totalkilled; 
                if (seesimoutput==true) { 
                    System.out.println(); 
                    System.out.println(“total killed on trial “+t+”: “+totalkilled); 
                    System.out.println(); 
                } 
            }  
            System.out.println(); 
            System.out.println(“cumulative: “+cumulative+”  trials: “+trials); 
            avg = (double)cumulative/trials; 
            System.out.println(“avg: “+avg); 
            System.out.println(“EV[s=”+salvos+”][w=”+weapinvent+”][a=”+attackers+”]:  
“+EV[salvos][weapinvent][attackers]); 
            System.out.println(); 
        }  


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 67
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
 
1. Arquilla, John, et al., Swarming and the Future of Conflict, Santa Monica, 
California: RAND, 2000 
 
 
2. Daniel H. Wagner, et. al.ed., Naval Operations Analysis, Annapolis, Maryland: 
Naval Institute Press, 1999 
 
 
3. Eckler, A. Ross, et. al., Mathematical Models of Target Converage and Missile 
Allocation, Military Operations Research Society, 1972 
 
 
















8. Huges, Wayne P., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 2000 
 
 
9. Kress, Moshe, Class Notes, Advanced Combat Models, Operations Research 
Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March, 2003. 
 
 
10. Postol, Theodore A., “Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot,” 
International Security 16 (3), Winter 1991/1992. 
 
 




12. Washburn, Alan R., Notes on Firing Theory, Monterey, California: Naval 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
3. Professor Alan R. Washburn 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
5. Professor Moshe Kress 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
6. Professor Yeo Tat Soon 
Director, Temasek Defence Systems Institute 
Block E1 #05-05 
Singapore  
 
7. Henry S. Kim 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
